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Strategic Risk Management Behavior: 
What Can Utility Functions Tell Us? 
 
Abstract 
The validity of the utility concept, particularly in an expected utility framework, has been 
questioned because of its inability to predict revealed behavior. In this paper we focus on 
the global shape of the utility function instead of the local shape of the utility function. 
We examine the extent of heterogeneity in the global shape of the utility function of 
decision makers and test whether its shape predicts strategic risk management behavior. 
We assess the utility functions and relate them to strategic decisions for portfolio 
managers (N = 104) and hog farmers (N = 239). The research design allows us to 
examine the robustness of our results and the extent to which the results can be 
generalized. Furthermore, we assess the shape of the utility functions for these decision 
makers applying two different methods. This allows us to further test the robustness of 
our empirical results. If there exists a relationship between the shape of the utility 
function and strategic decisions, both methods should yield the same result. The 
empirical results indicate that the global shape of the utility function differs across 
decision makers (fully concave or convex versus S-shaped), and that the global shape 
predicts strategic decisions (e.g., asset allocation strategy in the case of portfolio 
managers; type of production process employed in the case of hog farmers). These 
findings support the notion that the often criticized concept of utility is a useful concept 
when studying actual behavior, and highlight the importance of considering decision-
maker behavior over a wide outcome range when examining strategic behavior.   2
Introduction 
Utility is an important theoretical concept in economics, marketing, finance, and the 
management sciences and has been extensively used to derive optimal behavior of 
decision-makers or to describe actual behavior behavior (Schoemaker). The validity of 
the utility concept, particularly in an expected utility framework, has been questioned 
because of its inability to predict revealed behavior. There is an extensive body of 
literature that discusses these anomalies (e.g., Rabin, 1998, 2000; Camerer).
1 A particular 
challenge with utility is how to quantify the concept to permit testing of its empirical 
merits. Utility is often measured using the certainty equivalence technique (or elicitation 
techniques derived from it) in empirical studies that deal with decision making under risk 
(Keeney and Raiffa; Farquhar). In the certainty equivalence technique the researcher asks 
the decision maker to compare a lottery (xl,p;xh) with a certain outcome, where (xl,p;xh) is 
the two-outcome lottery that assigns probability p to outcome xl and probability 1-p to 
outcome xh, with xl<xh. The researcher then varies the certain outcome until the 
respondent reveals indifference between the certain outcome denoted by CE(p). 
Substituting in the expected utility model with the von Neumann Morgenstern utility u 
one obtains: uC Ep p ux pux lh (( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = + − 1 . After obtaining a set of certainty 
equivalents corresponding to different utility levels a function is fit to arrive at the 
decision maker’s utility function. 
Studies that use the certainty equivalence technique or related utility elicitation 
procedures to obtain the decision maker’s utility function u(x) use the curvature of the 
                                                 
1 In this paper we do not review this literature but refer the reader to Kahneman, Slovic and 
Tversky, Camerer, McFadden, and Thaler. 
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utility function as measured by the Pratt-Arrow coefficient, –u’’(x)/u’(x), as a proxy for 
the decision-maker’s risk attitude (e.g., Binswanger, 1981, 1980; Smidts). The failure to 
find a relationship between decision-makers’ utility functions and actual behavior may be 
attributed to the fact that the curvature of the utility function is a local measure, often 
conceptualized as an unidimensional construct. For example, Pennings and Smidts (2000) 
estimate an exponential function to relate the certainty equivalents to the corresponding 
utility levels. Scaling the u(x) between 0-1 only one parameter is needed to estimate the 
curvature of the utility function. While this approach is attractive since only one 
parameter needs to be estimated and the interpretation of that parameter is 
straightforward (i.e., it represents a decision-maker’s risk attitude), the procedure 
condenses the potential multidimensionality of a decision-makers utility function to a 
single dimension which can result in a significant loss of valuable information. 
Specifically, this approach does not explicitly take into account the entire outcome range 
of the relevant attribute x used to obtain the utility function (often money is used as 
relevant attribute). 
In this paper, using the elicitation procedures developed by Pennings and Smidts 
(2000), we investigate how strategic decisions are related to the entire (global) shape of 
the utility function rather than to the curvature of the utility function measure of risk 
attitude (Pratt-Arrow).
2 Specifically, we first investigate the shape of the utility function 
across the total outcome domain x to determine whether its shape (i.e., fully concave or 
convex vs. S-shaped) differs across decision makers. We then examine whether the 
differences in the global shape of the utility function affect strategic behavior. Strategic 
                                                 
2 Global shape is defined as the general shape of the utility function over the entire outcome 
domain.   4
decisions are those that determine the overall direction and organization of an enterprise 
and have far reaching effects on its structure (e.g., Quinn, Mintzberg and James). These 
decisions have an impact on the whole outcome domain of the firm. Since the global 
shape of the utility function takes that total outcome domain into account (i.e., the total 
range of attribute x), we suspect its shape to be a predictor for strategic decisions. 
Kahnenan and Tversky, Rabin (2000), Rabin and Thaler Pennings and Smidts (2003) 
who argued that a local measure of utility may not be of great interest when trying to 
understand decision-makers behavior over a wide outcome range seem to support this 
hypothesis.   
To test our hypothesis we assessed the utility function of 104 portfolio managers 
in face-to-face computer guided interviews using the certainty equivalence method who 
were managing their firms’ equity investments or who were managing their own 
portfolios. The certainty equivalents were obtained through choice-based matching 
(Keeney and Raiffa). Furthermore, accounting data were available from these managers 
regarding their strategic behavior (e.g., whether or not they invest in non-exchange traded 
assets). In addition, we elicited the utility function of 239 hog farmers using a similar 
research design and obtained accounting data regarding their strategic decisions (e.g., 
production system employed). This research design allows us to test whether the 
hypothesis of the relationships between strategic behavior and the shape of the utility 
function holds for different domains. The hog farming context has been used in Pennings 
and Smidts (2003) as well to investigate the relationship between farmers’ utility 
functions and their organization behavior, allowing us to further examine the robustness 
of their results.    5
The contribution of the research is twofold. We show that the global shape of the 
utility function differs across decision makers (fully concave or convex versus S-shaped), 
and that the global shape predicts strategic decisions (e.g., asset allocation strategy in the 
case of portfolio managers; type of production process employed in the case of hog 
farmers). These findings support the notion that the often criticized concept of utility is a 
useful concept when studying actual behavior, and highlight the importance of 
considering decision-maker behavior over a wide outcome range when examining 
strategic behavior. It is important to note that the research does not explain strategic 
behavior, rather it shows that strategic behavior can be predicted by the global shape of 
the decision-maker’s utility function. Further, the research does not answer the question 
what drives the global shape of the utility function. We elaborate on this issue in the 
discussion section. 
In the following section we discuss conceptual issues regarding the global shape 
of the utility function, followed by our research design. Subsequently the utility 
elicitation procedure is described and empirical results are presented and discussed. 
 
Global Shape of Utility Functions 
Utility has been a concept that has been used throughout the history of economics. In 
1789 Bentham discussed the concept of utility as being a central concept in 
understanding human behavior. The utility concept has been used in various ways in the 
economics literature, and is used to represent preferences (e.g., von Neumann 
Morgenstern context) or to determine preferences (neoclassical context). Furthermore 
utility has often been discussed in terms of “cardinal” and “ordinal” utility (von Neumann   6
and Morgenstern; Baumol; Mosteller and Nogee; Friedman and Savage; Alchian; 
Ellsberg; Schoenaker; Fuhrken and Richter). In the neoclassical context, ordinal utility 
provides only a ranking of risky prospects while cardinal utility refers to a decision-
maker’s strength-of-preference function for consequences under certainty. In a 
measurement context cardinal and ordinal utility refers to the scale properties of the 
utility function (whether or not utility has interval properties) (Stevens). In this paper we 
view utility as ordinal in the neoclassical context and cardinal in the measurement 
context.  
  In the economics literature, concave utility functions have been associated with 
risk aversion and convex utility functions with risk-prone behavior. Pratt and Arrow 
proposed a local measure of risk aversion for U(x) as the negative ratio of the second to 
the first derivative, i.e., 
) ( '
) ( ' '
x U
x U
− . This measure is invariant under linear transformation 
and assumes constant value for linear and exponential functions. This measure has been 
used to explain and predict risk management decisions. The curvature of the decision-
maker’s utility function is a convenient measure for empirical researchers as it can be 
estimated in a single-parameter model (e.g., exponential functions are often used to 
estimate the curvature of utility function assuming CARA). Various authors have used 
the local shape of the utility function to predict and explain behavior. In this context the 
curvature of the utility function is equated with a decision-maker’s risk attitude. Often the 
exponential utility function given by 
cx e x u
− − = ) (  is used to represent a decision-maker’s 
utility function. Modeling the curvature (e.g., c) of the utility function implies that the 
local shape of the utility function (e.g. risk aversion) is constant over the total outcome   7
range x, and hence the curvature of the utility function does not take the total outcome 
range into account.  
Tversky and Kahneman’ prospect theory suggested that the global shape of the 
utility function, - its shape across the total outcome range - could be useful when trying to 
understand decision making under risk. In prospect theory, the shape of a decision-makers’ 
utility function is assumed to differ between the domain of gains and the domain of losses. 
The proposed convex/concave utility function predicts risk-prone behavior in the domain of 
losses and risk-averse behavior in the domain of gains. Evidence for convex/concave utility 
functions across the total outcome domain has been found by, among others, Fishburn and 
Kochenberger, Hershey and Schoemaker, Budescu and Weiss, Kuhberger, Schulte-
Mecklenbeck and Perner, and Pennings and Smidts (2003).  
 
Research Design 
We assess the utility functions and relate them to strategic decisions for two different 
classes of real decision-makers. This research design allows us to examine the robustness 
of our results and the extent to which the results can be generalized. The first class of 
decision makers are portfolio managers who are responsible for managing the assets that 
companies hold to meet retirement obligations. The second class of decision makers are 
hog farmers. Furthermore, we assess the shape of the utility functions for these decision 
makers applying two different methods. This allows us to further test the robustness of 
our empirical results. If there exists a relationship between the shape of the utility 
function and strategic decisions, both methods should yield similar results. We show that 
the relationship between the shape of the utility function and strategic decisions do not   8
depend on the particular choice of the family of utility curves. We first describe the 
decision contexts of the two classes of decision makers (portfolio managers and hog 
farmers), then describe the utility elicitation process followed by the two methods used to 
asses the global shape of the decision-maker’s utility function. 
 
Decision Context 
To examine whether the global shape of the utility function is driving strategic decisions 
we need a context in which strategic decisions can be observed and in which the utility 
functions can be elicited from decision makers that make strategic decisions. To test 
whether the hypothesis on the relationships between strategic decisions and utility 
functions holds for different domains we test the hypothesis in two domains that meet the 
requirements outlined above. The domains are portfolio managers making decisions 
regarding their portfolios, and hog farmers making decisions regarding the production 
process they employ. 
 
Portfolio managers’ context 
Portfolio managers make important investment decisions on a regular basis, weighing 
risk and returns and making trade-offs between the two. Portfolio managers will at times 
evaluate the asset allocation classes in which they invest. One of the strategic decisions 
that portfolio managers have to make is whether to invest in assets that are not traded in a 
central exchange. These assets, often referred to as “bricks and mortar”, are direct 
investments in commercial property or in private companies. These investments are not 
as liquid as stocks and bonds which can easily be sold and bought through exchanges.   9
Furthermore these assets have relatively high transaction costs (e.g., one has to manage 
the property etc.). The trading characteristics of bonds and stocks are very different from 
the non-exchange traded assets. While bonds and stocks can be easily sold and bought 
almost immediately and price quotations are almost always present, non-exchange traded 
assets can not be bought and sold immediately and price information may not always be 
available. Euronext, the result of a merger of the financial markets in Amsterdam, 
Brussels, London and Paris, provided us with the names of portfolio managers from large 
corporations who were managing their firms’ assets to meet retirement obligations and 
provided the names and addresses of private portfolio managers who managing portfolio 
on behalf of others or managed their own accounts. Individuals were contacted by phone, 
informed about the study, and invited to participate. If they agreed, an appointment was 
made to conduct the experiments during a later visit. The response rate was high, 87% of 
those invited chose to participate, totaling 104 portfolio managers.  
 
Hog farming context 
Hog farmers make an implicit or explicit decision regarding the production system that 
they employ, a strategic decision that is far-reaching and that impacts the fundamental 
structure of the farm. In hog farming, two production systems are distinguished: the 
‘open production system’ (OPS) and the ‘closed production system’ (CPS). In the OPS, 
both piglets are bought; piglets are then feed for three or four months until they are ready 
for slaughter. In the CPS the hog farmer breeds rather than buys the piglets, which 
requires a very different production system as the farmer has to take care of the breeding 
stock, the birth process etc. The two production systems have also different   10
characteristics with respect to the net cash flow streams it generates over time. In the OPS 
the hog farmers are more often and more explicitly confronted with input costs, than the 
hog farmers who choose the CPS, in particular the expenses of buying piglets (the 
costliest input in the production process). As a consequence the net-cash flow pattern is 
different for the different production systems. A list of Dutch hog farmers was obtained 
from the Dutch Farmers Union, and farmers were asked to participate in an University-
led research project on risk. A total of 239 farmers participated in the computer guided 
interviews. 
 
Elicitation of Utility Function 
We assessed the utility function of the portfolio managers and hog farmers by means of 
computer-guided interviews. The utility function was measured using the certainty 
equivalence method (Keeney and Raiffa; Smidts). The certainty equivalents were 
obtained through choice-based matching (Keeney and Raiffa; Fischer et al.). In designing 
the lottery task, we took into account the findings of research on the sources of bias in 
assessment procedures for utility functions (Krzysztofowicz and Duckstein; Hershey, 
Kunreuther and Schoemaker; Hershey and Schoemaker; Harrison; Tversky, Sattath and 
Slovic; Kagel and Roth; Holt and Laury). The main sources of bias arise when the 
assessment does not match the subjects’ real decision situation. What is particular 
powerful about the research design is that we are dealing with decisions in a relevant 
context ensuring that the task reflects the subjects’ daily decision making behavior 
(Smith). For the portfolio managers this meant that certainty equivalence technique was 
formulated in terms of relatively high/low returns with a range of –5% to +20%, with a   11
probability of 0.5 and a fixed return.
3 The assessment of the certainty equivalents was an 
iterative process. If the manager chose alternative A (the 50/50 high/low return), the 
computer would generate a randomly a higher fixed return (alternative B) than the 
previous, thus making alternative B more attractive or a lower fixed price making 
alternative A more attractive. If the manager chose alternative B, the computer would 
generate randomly a lower or higher fixed return (alternative B) the next time, thus 
making alternative A (alternative B) more attractive.
 4 The next measurement would start 
after the respondent had indicated an indifference between alternative A or B. 
The research design for hog farmers was similar to the portfolio managers’ 
research design except that the main attribute in the certainty equivalence technique is the 
price per kilogram live hog weight. The outcome levels range from 1.06 Euro to 1.95 
Euro per kilogram live weight, representing all price levels of slaughter hogs that have 
occurred in the last five years. The 50/50 dimension of the lottery reflects the 
environment in which portfolio managers and hog farmers are exposed to. Various 
researchers have shown the stochastic behavior of both commodity prices and stock 
prices (Schwartz; Hilliard and Reis).  
The measurement procedure was computerized and took about 20 minutes.
5 Nine 
points of the decision maker’s utility function were assessed, corresponding to utilities of 
0.125, 0.250, 0.375, 0.500, 0.625, 0.750, 0.875 (plus two consistency measurements on 
                                                 
3 The in-depth interviews revealed that these boundaries reflected the managers’ minimum and 
maximum expected returns 
4 This randomization was introduced since Harrison identified that there is an incentive for 
individuals to keep choosing A in the case there is no randomization, because by doing so, 
respondents would ensure receiving a higher fixed price.  
5 The experimental design, imbedded in the computer-guided interview, and the computer-guided 
interview program are available from the authors. 
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utilities 0.500 and 0.625). For details on a similar elicitation procedure, see Pennings and 
Smidts (2000).  
 
Assessing the Shape of Decision-Makers’ Global Utility Functions 
Based on previous studies we identify two broad classes of shapes; fully concave, 
fully convex or S-shaped (convex/concave). Fully concave or convex utility functions 
have been widely used in the economics literature. Evidence for fully concave or convex 
utility functions across the total outcome domain has been found by, among others, 
Binswanger (1982) and Pennings and Smidts (2000). An S-shaped utility function has 
been proposed in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky). In prospect theory, the shape 
of a decision-makers’ utility function is assumed to differ between the domain of losses 
and the domain of gains. The proposed convex/concave utility function predicts risk-
prone behavior in the loss domain and risk-averse behavior in the gain domain.  
  We assessed the shape of the utility function using two distinctive methods to test 
whether the assessment of a decision-maker’s global shape of the utility function is 
robust.  
In the first method, referred to as the EXP-IPT-method, we fit the observations for 
each decision maker (the nine assessed certainty equivalents) to both the negative 
exponential function (EXP) and to the log of the inverse power transformation function 
(IPT), and the latter being an S-shaped utility function.  
In the second method to assess the shape of the utility function, the two-piece 
utility function method, we decompose the utility function into two exponential 
segments, one for consequences above the reference point (gain domain) and the other for   13
consequences below the reference point (loss domain). As a natural reference point we 
took the stated target return on their portfolio for the portfolio managers (the average 
target return in our sample was 9.5%). For the hog farmer context we used the average 
cost of production as reference point which was 1.31 Euro per kilogram live weight as 
identified by experts in that industry. By estimating the EXP-function for each segment, 
we obtain for each respondent two parameters: cg for the gain domain and cl for the loss 
domain (recall that c in the exponential function represents the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion). These parameters allow us to describe the decision-maker’s shape 
of the utility function as a combination of cg and cl. We can classify decision makers 
based on four different shapes of the utility function: cl > 0 and cg > 0 implying a concave 
utility function for both gains and losses; cl < 0 and cg < 0 implying a fully convex utility 
function; cl > 0 and cg < 0 implying a reversed S-shaped utility function, and cl < 0 and cg 
> 0 implying an S-shaped function.  
Results 
First we describe the results for the estimates of the global shape of the utility function 
for portfolio managers and hog farmers for both methods (EXP-IPT method and the two-
piece utility function method), and discuss the classification of these decision makers by 
comparing the two methods. Subsequently, we examine the relationship between the 
global shape of the utility function and strategic decisions.  
 
Heterogeneity in the Global Shape of the Utility Function 
We first determined which functional form best reflects each decision maker’s utility 
function based on a pairwise comparison of the mean squared errors (MSE) and classify   14
the decision makers in the corresponding groups (fully convex/concave or S-shaped). 
One group consisted of portfolio managers whose utility function is best described by the 
exponential function (an EXP-group; n = 53 (51%)), the other group consisted of 
portfolio managers whose function is best described by the S-shaped function (an IPT-
group; n = 51 (49%)). A comparison of the estimation results from the homogeneous case 
(i.e., estimation results of the EXP and IPT function for all decision makers) with those 
from the heterogeneous case (estimation results for the EXP-group and IPT-group) 
indicated that the average fit for both functions increases and that the parameter estimates 
change substantially when taking heterogeneity into account. In particular, the mean 
MSE of the EXP-function drops from 0.007 for the total group to 0.004 for the 51 EXP-
subjects. For the IPT-group, the increase is 0.002. Similar results were found for the hog 
farmers. One group consisted of hog farmers whose utility function is best described by 
the exponential function (an EXP-group; n = 144 (60%)), the other group consisted of 
hog farmers whose function is best described by the S-shaped function (an IPT-group; n 
= 95 (40%)). Also here we find heterogeneity with respect to the shape of the utility 
function. The average fit for both the EXP and IPT functions have increased and that the 
parameter estimates have changed substantially by taking heterogeneity into account. 
These results show that decision makers differ regarding the global shape of their utility 
function. Next, we examine the global shape of the utility function using the two-piece 
utility function method, allowing us to examine whether the results of the EXP-IPT-
method are robust. 
The results for the two-piece utility function method for portfolio managers 
indicate that 47.1% (n = 49) of the portfolio managers have utility functions that are   15
concave for both the loss and gain domain (i.e., cl > 0 and cg > 0), and hence are said to be 
risk averse across the total outcome domain (e.g., Table 1). A smaller group of portfolio 
managers (5.7%; n = 6) can be described as being risk prone across the entire outcome 
domain (i.e., cl < 0 and cg < 0). Only a few portfolio managers (6.7%; n = 7) show a 
reversed S-shaped utility function (i.e., cl > 0 and cg<0) and 40.4% (n = 42) of the 
portfolio managers exhibit an S-shaped utility function. These results confirm our 
previous finding using the EXP-IPT method that portfolio managers differ regarding the 
global shape of their utility function. For hog farmers, we also find that, using the two-
piece utility function method, they differ regarding the global shape of the utility 
function, supporting our earlier findings. Table 1 shows that the two-piece utility function 
method results indicate that 47.1% (n = 49) of the hog farmers have utility functions that 
are concave for both the loss and gain domain (i.e., cl > 0 and cg > 0), and hence are said 
to be risk averse across the total outcome domain. A smaller group of hog farmers (5.8%; 
n = 6)) can be described as being risk prone across the entire outcome domain (i.e., cl < 0 
and cg < 0). Only a few hog farmers (6.7%; n = 7) show a reversed S-shaped utility 
function (i.e., cl > 0 and cg<0). About 40.4% (n = 42) of the hog farmers exhibit an S-
shaped utility function 
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Robustness of Classification 
To examine whether the EXP-IPT-method and the two-piece utility function method 
identify similar global shapes of the utility function for decision makers, we compare the 
two methods for the portfolio managers and hog farmers. 
 
Table 1 Correspondence in Classification of the EXP-IPT-method and the Two-Piece 
Utility Function Method for Portfolio Managers and Hog Farmers 
 The  EXP-IPT-Method 
Portfolio Managers 
Two-piece Utility Function Method  EXP-function IPT-function 
Concave function (cl > 0 and cg > 0)  
47.1% (n = 49) 
91.8% (n = 45)  8.2% (n = 4) 
Convex function (cl < 0 and cg < 0) 
5.8% (n = 6) 
83.3% (n = 5)  16.6% (n = 1) 
Reversed S-shaped function (cl > 0 and cg < 0) 
6.7% (n = 7) 
14.3% (n = 1)  85.7% (n = 6) 
S-shaped function (cl < 0 and cg > 0) 
40.4% (n = 42) 
4.8% (n = 2)  95.2% (n = 40) 
Total  50.9% (n = 53)  49.1% (n = 51) 
 
Hog Farmers 
Concave function (cl > 0 and cg > 0) 
40.2% (n = 96) 
93.7% (n = 90)  6.25% (n = 6) 
Convex function (cl < 0 and cg < 0) 
18.4% (n = 44) 
89.1% (n = 40)  9.1% (n = 4) 
Reversed S-shaped function (cl > 0 and cg < 0) 
4.2% (n = 10) 
30.0% (n = 3)  70.0% (n = 7) 
S-shaped function (cl < 0 and cg > 0) 
37.2% (n = 89) 
12.4% (n = 11)  87.6% (n =78) 
Total  60.3% (n = 144)  39.7% (n = 95) 
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The results in Table 1 show that classifying respondents with regards to the shape of the 
utility function is not dependent on the method used, providing evidence that the 
identification of the global shape of the utility function is robust. 
 
Shape of Utility Functions & Strategic Decisions 
After showing heterogeneity in the shape of the utility function of real business decision-
makers, we investigate whether the shape of the utility function is reflected in decision-
makers’ strategic behavior using the results of the EXP-IPT method to identify the global 
shape of the decision-maker’s utility function. We do not present the results based on the 
two-piece utility function method which are similar to those presented. 
  The upper part of Table 2 shows how the functional form of a portfolio manager’s 
global utility function (EXP vs. IPT) is related to strategic behavior. Overall, 44.2% of 
the portfolio managers invested only in exchange traded assets while 55.8% invested also 
in assets not traded on an exchange. Of the portfolio managers with a concave or convex 
utility function (the EXP-group), 17.0% invested only in exchange traded assets and 
83.0% invested all assets. In contrast, of the portfolio managers with an S-shaped utility 
function (the IPT-group), 72.5% invested in only exchange traded assets, while 27.5% 
invested in non-exchange traded assets as well. These results indicate that portfolio 
managers whose global shape of the utility function can best be described by a EXP-type 
utility function (fully concave or fully convex over the total outcome range) have both 
exchange and non-exchange tradable assets in their portfolio, while portfolio managers 
whose global shape of the utility function can best be described by a IPT-type utility 
function (S-shaped utility function) invested only in exchange traded assets.    18
Table 2 Relationship Between Shape of the Utility Function (IPT vs. EXP) and 
Strategic Decisions for Portfolio Managers and Hog Farmers.* 
  Portfolio Managers 
  Invested only in 
exchange traded 
assets 
Invested in all asset 
classes  
Total 
Total  44.2% 55.8% 100%  (n = 104) 
     
EXP-group  17.0% 83.0% 100%  (n = 53) 
IPT-group  72.5% 27.5% 100%  (n = 51) 
     
  Hog Farmers 
  CPS   OPS   Total 
Total  54.4% 45.6% 100%  (n = 239) 
    
EXP-group  77.8% 22.2% 100%  (n = 144) 
IPT-group  18.9% 81.1% 100%  (n = 95) 
     
*Where the EXP-group consists of respondents for whom the shape of their utility function is 
described best by the exponential function (fully concave or fully convex), the IPT-group consists 
of respondents for whom the shape of their utility function is described best by the log of the 
inverse power transformation function (S-shape; see Appendix for function specifications). OPS 
denotes the open production system, CPS denotes the closed production system. 
 
The lower part of Table 2 shows the relationship between the shape of the utility function and 
strategic behavior for hog farmers. Overall, 54.4% of the farmers employed the CPS production 
system and 45.6% employed the OPS system. Of the farmers with a concave or convex utility 
function (the EXP-group), 77.8% employed the CPS and 22.2% employed OPS. In contrast, of 
the farmers with an S-shaped utility function (the IPT-group), 18.9% employed CPS, while 
81.1% used OPS. 
  The results of the portfolio manager domain and the hog farmer domain show that the 
global shape of the utility function is related to strategic behavior. To further gain insight in the 
predictive power of the global shape of the utility function we statistically test the relationship 
between the global shape of the utility function and strategic decisions by means of a logistic   19
regression analysis with the dichotomy of whether portfolio managers invest in all assets 
(exchange and non-exchange traded assets) or only in exchange traded assets, and whether hog 
farmers employs the CPS or OPS as the dependent variables and group-membership (EXP vs. 
IPT global utility function) as the independent variable. In the analysis for the portfolio 
managers, we controlled for the size of the portfolio managers’ portfolio, age, education, and 
debt-to-asset ratio. In the analysis for the hog farmers, we controlled for, age, education, and 
debt-to-asset ratio. 
Table 3 shows that the model for the portfolio managers significantly improves the 
fit, when compared to the null model, which includes only an intercept (p < 0.002); 
Nagelkerke R
2 = 0.39, correctly classified choices 76.9%. The regression coefficient of the 
shape of the utility function was significant (p =0.04) in the logistic regression. The 
variables age (p = 0.15), education (p = 0.15), debt-to-asset ratio (p = 0.16) and value of 
portfolio ((p = 0.38), were not significant. Table 3 shows also the results for the hog 
farmers. The model significantly improves the fit, when compared to the null model, 
which includes only an intercept (p < 0.00; Nagelkerke R
2 = 0.42, correctly classified 
choices 79.1%).   20
Table 3 Results of Logistic Regression in which the Shape of the Utility Function 
(IPT vs. EXP) Predicts Strategic Decisions 
 
 Portfolio  managers 
 
Trading in all assets (=0) or 
trading in only exchange  
traded assets (= 1) 
Hog farmers 
Production system employed by 
hog farmers: OPS (= 1) or  
CPS (= 0) 
 B  P  B  P 
Shape of the utility function: 
(IPT = 1; EXP = 0) 
-1.768* 0.04  2.83*  0.00 
Age 0.07  0.15  -0.03  0.11 
Education -1.53  0.15    0.20  0.35 
Debt-to-asset ratio  0.06  0.16  0.16  0.28 
Average value of portfolio for  
which portfolio manager was 
responsible in 2000 
0.53 0.38     
Nagelkerke R
2 0.39  0.42 
Correctly classified choices  76.9%  79.1% 
Note. The cutoff value in the misclassification test is 0.500. An asterisk indicates that each 
parameter significantly (p < 0.05) improves the fit, when compared to the null model, which only 
includes an intercept. Nagelkerke’s R
2 is similar to the R
2 in linear regression, and measures the 
proportion of variance of the dependent variable from its mean, which can be explained by the 
independent variables. The debt-to-asset ratio was measured on a 10-point scale with 1 = debt-to-
asset ratio 1-9%, 2 = 10-19%, etc. The maximum level of education was measured on a 5-point 
scale ranging from high school to university degree, age is measured in years, the average value 
of the portfolio for which the portfolio manager was responsible was measured on a 8-point scale 
with 1 < 1 million, 2= 1-10 million, 3 = 10-50 million, 4 = 50-100 million, 5 = 100- 500 million, 
6 =500 million – 1 billion, 7 = 1-5 billion, 8 = > 5 billion. 
 
The regression coefficient of the shape of the utility function was clearly significant (p 
=0.000) in the logistic regression. The variables age (p = 0.11), education (p = 0.35), and 
debt-to-asset ratio (p = 0.28) were not significant. These results further support the 
relationship between the global shape of the utility function and strategic behavior.  
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Discussion 
The results show that there is heterogeneity in the shape of utility functions of real 
decision makers and that this heterogeneity affects strategic decisions. The empirical 
results are robust with regards to the method used to determine the shape of the decision-
maker’s global shape of the utility function and the domain of the decision makers. These 
results indicate that the information that is embedded in the shape of the utility function is 
a predictor of actual strategic behavior. Furthermore, the results show that the while the 
utility concept has been critiqued for not being useful when predicting actual behavior, it 
is a powerful concept when the decision-maker’s global utility function is examined 
instead of the local utility function (e.g., curvature of the utility function).  
   There is an extensive body of literature that outlines the potential pitfalls of eliciting 
utility functions using certainty equivalent technique types of experiments (e.g., Harrison; 
Kagel and Roth; Holt and Laury). While the experimental design for this research was 
hypothetical in the sense that the choices that the decision makers made did not affect their 
actual wealth or well being, they were not hypothetical with regards to decisions that the 
respondents make. The certainty equivalent technique was designed so that the choices made 
during the experiments resembled their daily decisions. Hence, these decision makers were 
very experienced with regards to the consequences of these decisions. One of the portfolio 
managers even offered the comment “this isn’t difficult; I make these decisions daily”.  
To test whether the elicitation technique suffered estimation biases as identified in 
the aforementioned references we conducted two additional analyses. First, we obtained 
two measurements at u(x) = 0.5 and two at u(x) = 0.625 during the utility elicitation 
process (for both portfolio managers and hog farmers), in order to investigate the internal   22
consistency of the assessments. When tested, the differences between the assessed 
certainty equivalents for the same utility levels were not significant (p > 0.99 (pairwise 
test)) for both consistency measurements for the portfolio managers and hog farmers, 
showing that respondents assessed the certainty equivalents in an internally consistent 
manner. Second the parameter estimated of the S-shape utility function (IPT-group) allow 
us to calculate the average point of inflexion for the decision makers that best could be 
described by a S-shape utility function. The calculated point of inflexion of for hog 
farmers is 1.33 Euro per kilogram live weight hogs, which corresponds closely to the 
production costs of 1.31 Euro per kilogram estimated by experts from the industry at the 
time of the research. For the portfolio managers we used their target return to statistically 
compare the point of inflexion of portfolio manager i with the target return for portfolio 
manager i. When tested, the differences between the point of inflexion and the target 
return were not significant (p > 0.99 (pairwise test)). These analyses clearly indicate that 
by using a realistic decision context using real business decision makers valid utility 
functions can be elicited (Smith). 
  In this paper we implicitly assumed that the global shape of the utility function 
drives strategic decisions. The rationale for this causality is that one could see the elicited 
utility function as a reflection of the decision-maker’s behavior. However recent literature 
on constructed preferences argues that due to limited processing capacity, decision 
makers often do not have well-defined preferences, but these are constructed on the spot 
by an adaptive decision maker (e.g., Bettman, Frances and Payne; Butler). This literature 
argues that the decision context in which decision makers operate shapes their utility 
functions. Only longitudinal research can provide some empirical insight on this topic.   23
Such a research design would investigate whether decision makers change their strategic 
behavior and determine whether the shape of their utility function changes after a shapes 
change in strategic behavior.  
In this paper we did not explain strategic behavior. The question that needs to be 
addressed in future research is: what drives the shape of the utility function? While early 
work in economics focused on the drivers of utility (e.g., Lange; Armstrong) identifying 




Alchian, A.A. “The Meaning of Utility Measurement.” American Economic Review 
43(March 1953): 26-50. 
Armstrong, W.E. “The Determinateness of the Utility Function.” Economic Journal 
49(September 1939): 543-567. 
Arrow, K.J. Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. Chicago: Markham, 1971. 
Baumol, W.J. “The Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Index: An Ordinalist View.” 
Journal of Political Economy 59(February 1951): 61-66. 
Bentham, J. The Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendom Press, 1789. 
Bettman, J.R., L.M. Frances, and J.W. Payne. “Constructive Consumer Choice Processes.” 
Journal of Consumer Research 25(1998): 187-217. 
Binswanger, H.P. “Attitudes toward Risk: Experimental Measurement in Rural India.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62(August 1980): 395-407.   24
Binswanger, H. P. (1981) “Attitudes toward Risk: Theoretical Implications of An 
Experiment in Rural India,” Economic Journal 91(December 1981): 867-890. 
Binswanger, H.P. “Empirical Estimation and Use of Risk Preferences: Discussion.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64(May 1982): 391-393. 
Budescu, D.V., and W. Weiss “Reflection of Transitive and Intransitive Preferences: A 
Test of Prospect Theory.” Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 
39(1987): 184-202. 
Butler, D.J. “Do Non-Expected Utility Choice Patterns Spring from Hazy Preferences? An 
Experimental Study of Choice Errors.” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 41(2000): 277-97. 
Camerer, C. “Individual Decision Making,” in J.Kagel and A. Roth, eds., Handbook of 
Experimental Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Ellsberg, D. “Classic and Current Notions of Measurable Utility.” Economic Journal 
64(September 1954): 528-556. 
Farquhar, P. H. “Utility Assessment Methods.” Management Science 30(November 
1984): 1283-1300, 
Fischer, G.W., Z. Carmon, D. Ariely, and G. Zauberman. “Goal-based Construction of 
Preferences: Task Goals and the Prominence Effect.” Management Science 
45(1999): 1057-1075. 
Fishburn, P.C. and G.A. Kochenberger. “Two-piece Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility 
Functions.” Decision Sciences 10(1979): 503-518. 
Friedman, M. and L. Savage. “The Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Measurement of 
Utility.” Journal of Political Economy 60(December 1952): 463-474.   25
Furken, G. and M. K. Richter 1991. “Additive Utility.” Economic Theory 1(January 
1991): 83-105. 
Harisson, G. “Risk Aversion and Preference Distortion in Deterministic Bargaining 
Experiments.” Economics Letters 22 (1986): 191-196. 
Hershey, J.C., and P.J.H. Schoemaker. “Risk Taking and Problem Context in the Domain 
of Losses: An expected Utility Analysis.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 
47(1980): 111-132. 
Hershey, J. C., Kunreuther, H. C., P.J.H. Schoemaker. “Sources of Bias in Assessment 
Procedures for Utility Functions.” Management Science 28(August 1982): 936-54.  
Hilliard, J.E., and J.A. Reis. “Jump Processes in Commodity Futures Prices and Options 
Pricing.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(May 1999): 273-286. 
Holt, C. A., and S.K. Laury. “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects.” American Economic 
Review 92(December 2002): 1644-1655. 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.” 
Econometrica 47(1979): 363-291. 
Kagel, John. H. and Roth, Alvin E. (eds.). The Handbook of Experimental Economics 
Princeton: Princeton University press, 1995. 
Keeney, R.L. and H. Raiffa. Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value 
Tradeoffs. Wiley, New York, 1979. 
Kuhberger, A., M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and J. Perner. “The Effects of Framing, 
Reflection, Probability, and Payoff on Risk Preference in Choice Tasks.” 
Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 78(1999): 204-231.   26
Krzysztofowicz, R. and L. Duckstein. “Assessment Errors in Multiattribute Utility 
Functions.” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 26(1980): 326-
348. 
Lange, O. “The Determinateness of the Utility Function.” Review of Economic Studies 
1(1934): 218-25. 
McFadden, D. “Rationality for Economists.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 19(1999): 
73-105. 
Mosteller, F. and P. Nogee. “An Experimental Measurement of Utility.” Journal of 
Political Economy 59(October 1951): 371-404. 
Pennings, J.M.E. and P. Garcia. “Measuring Producers’ Risk Preferences: A Global Risk 
Attitude Construct.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83(2001): 993-
1009. 
Pennings, J.M.E., and A. Smidts. “Assessing the Construct Validity of Risk Attitude.” 
Management Science 46(October 2000):1337-1348. 
Pennings, J.M.E. and A. Smidts. “The Shape of Utility Functions & Organizational 
Behavior.” Management Science 49(2003): 1251-1263. 
Pratt, J.W. “Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large.” Econometrica 32(January/April 
1964):122-136. 
Quinn, J. B, H. Mintzberg, and R. M. James. The Strategy Process. Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1988. 
Rabin M. “Psychology and Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 36(1998): 11-
46.   27
Rabin, M. “Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem.” 
Econometrica 68(2000): 1281-1292. 
Rabin, M., and R.H. Thaler. “Anomalies: Risk aversion.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 15(2001): 219-232. 
Robison, L. J. “An Appraisal of Expected Utility Hypothesis Tests Constructed from 
Responses to Hypothetical Questions and Experimental Choices.” American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 64(May 1982): 366-375. 
Schoemaker, P.J.H. “The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and 
Limitations.” Journal of Economic Literature 20(1982): 529-563. 
Schwartz, E.S. “The Stochastic Behavior of Commodity Prices: Implications for 
Valuation and Hedging.” Journal of Finance 52(July 1997): 923-73. 
Smidts, A. “The Relationship Between Risk Attitude and Strength of Preference: A Test 
of Intrinsic Risk Attitude.” Management Science 43(March 1997):357-370. 
Smith, V. L. “Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology.” 
Journal of Political Economy 99(August 1991): 877-97. 
Stevens, S.S. “On the theory of Scales of Measurement.” Science 103(1946): 677-80. 
Thaler, Richard H. “From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 14(2000): 133-141. 
Tversky, A., S. Sattath, and P. Slovic. “Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice.” 
Psychological Review 95(July 1988): 371-84.  
Von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944. 
 